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COMMENTS
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN FLORIDA: PRESCRIPTION
FOR CHANGE
B. RICHARD YOUNG
I. INTRODUCTION
Between 1970 and 1975, more than twenty medical malpractice
liability insurers cancelled their coverage of Florida physicians and
withdrew from the medical malpractice insurance market in Flor-
ida.' This action sparked a growing fear in Florida health care
providers which peaked in 1975.2 Concerned over the unavailability
of medical malpractice liability coverage for some doctors3 and the
"astronomical" premium rates being charged to those physicians
who could obtain such coverage,' Florida doctors demanded that
the legislature take action on this crisis. With over $800,000 in the
war chest,6 the doctors got results in the form of the Medical Mal-
l. St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 6, 1975, § B, at 1, col. 2. The following excerpt vividly
demonstrates the demise: "In the first six months of 1973, the insurer's average cost per
claim was $8,000. A year later the average cost hit $19,500. Year-end incurred losses for 1974
by Employers Fire Insurance Company and Argonaut of California, the two major writers in
Florida, had jumped to $3.9 million." Ashler, Medical Malpractice Insurance-The Regula-
tors View, 49 FLA. B.J. 498, 506 (1975) (one of five separate articles dealing with the prob-
lem of medical malpractice).
2. See Note, The Florida Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REv.
50 (1976); French, Florida Departs from Tradition: The Legislative Response to the Medi-
cal Malpractice Crisis, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 423 (1978); Spence & Stillman, The Medical
Malpractice Reform Act of 1975: The Unanswered Issues of Carter v. Sparkman, 33 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1155 (1979).
California physicians reacted in a dramatic manner in northern California in May, 1975,
and in Los Angeles County in January-February, 1976, where anesthesiologists and surgeons
withheld their services for all but life-threatening emergency cases. Roemer & Schwartz,
Doctor Slowdown: Effects on the Population of Los Angeles County, 13C Soc. SCL & MED.
213 (1979).
3. French, supra note 2, at 423.
4. The Florida Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association announced new 1975
rates ranging from a low of $2,947 to a high of $29,590. The 1974 premium rates charged by
Employers Fire Insurance Company ranged from a low of $438 to a high of $4,974. The
Florida Medical Association, Report and Recommendations to the 1983 Legislature, the
Judiciary, and Citizens of Florida, 7 (1982).
5. Cook, Doctors Want Action on Malpractice Crisis, Tallahassee Democrat, July 27,
1975, § B, at 2, col. 1.
6. Cunningham & Lane, Malpractice-The Illusory Crisis, 54 FLA. B.J. 114, 114 (1980).
"In 1974-75, the Florida Medical Association assessed all physician members $100 each,
raising over $800,000 with which to finance an intensive lobbying effort." Id.
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practice Reform Act of 1975 (the Act).7 However, satisfaction with
the Act was shortlivedg due to a host of inadequacies9 and consti-
tutional infirmities.10 Consequently, the Florida Medical Associa-
tion (FMA) is once again closing ranks and preparing for another
assault on the Florida Legislature during its 1983 session.1 Unlike
previous sorties, this lobbying effort represents the FMA's attempt
to bring about significant and sweeping reforms" which are certain
to have a major impact on the treatment of medical malpractice in
Florida.
This article will review past and present medical malpractice leg-
islation with a view toward showing how Florida reached its pre-
sent state of affairs. Alternative proposed reforms will be analyzed
with respect to their potential viability. Finally, an attempt will be
made to bring together the best of these proposals to form a possi-
ble solution to this new crisis.13
II. THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM ACT OF 1975
The Florida Legislature's response to the alleged medical mal-
practice crisis was designed to effectuate stop-gap measures until
7. Ch. 75-9, 1975 Fla. Laws 13 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.40-56 (1981)).
8. Cook, supra note 5, at 2.
9. As of this writing the Florida Patients Compensation Fund is insolvent and on the
verge of bankruptcy, premiums for medical malpractice insurance are still rising, and debate
rages on over virtually every aspect of the 1975 Act. See generally, the Florida Medical
Association, Report and Recommendations to the 1983 Legislature, The Judiciary, and Cit-
izens of Florida (1982); The Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers, Self-Preservation of a Priv-
ileged Class (1982).
10. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980), held § 768.44, Florida Statutes (1979)
(relating to medical mediation panels) unconstitutional in its entirety. Problems also may be
encountered concerning Florida's constitutional provision guaranteeing "right of access to
the courts for redress of any injury" as regards the new shortened statute of limitations in
medical malpractice actions. See Dade County v. Ferro, 384 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1980) (court
avoided constitutional issue by holding that the statute did not apply retroactively).
11. See Report, supra note 4.
12. Id.
13. It was not very difficult to predict the coming of this second medical malpractice
crisis. As stated by one writer:
A recent annual meeting of the Physician's Insurers Association of America pro-
duced clear warnings. It was stated that although physician-sponsored companies
helped solve the 'availability crisis' for professional liability insurance for health
care providers, and have provided a market where the commercial carriers have
failed to do so, the basic problem has not been resolved. Very difficult times ahead
are predicted .... The next crisis [is] predicted for the early 1980's, starting with
much higher premium rates.
Thornton, The Value of Medical Mediation, 53 FLA. B.J. 592, 594 (1979).
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more concrete solutions could be worked out."' The Act repre-
sented the legislature's attempt to combine these measures into
one comprehensive piece of legislation. This legislation was aimed
at achieving three goals: (1) greater availability and affordability of
medical malpractice liability coverage through mandatory risk-
pooling by insurance carriers and the establishment of alternative
methods of insurance; (2) a reduction in the incidence of malprac-
tice through "house-keeping" programs designed to weed out in-
competent physicians and increase the quality of health care; and
(3) sweeping tort reforms, including the establishment of a new re-
view system containing both procedural and substantive rules cal-
culated to screen out nonmeritorious claims and cut down on the
total number of medical malpractice suits filed.1 5
A. Insurance Reform
In an effort to guarantee the availability of malpractice liability
insurance to all Florida physicians, regardless of risk category or
past experience,"8 the legislature established the Florida Medical
Malpractice Joint Underwriting Association (JUA).' The JUA,
which is similar to the "assigned risk pool" in automobile liability
insurance, 8 requires that every insurance carrier licensed to carry
casualty insurance in the state of Florida 9 and every self-insurer
licensed to issue medical malpractice insurance under Section
627.351(7), Florida Statutes,0 must participate in the plan. The
FMA initially endorsed the JUA plan, 2 but withdrew its endorse-
ment upon discovering that the new premium rates set by the JUA
were substantially higher than those offered by previous group lia-
bility insurers.22
In addition to past FMA opposition, 3 the JUA has also come
14. Note, supra note 2, at 104.
15. Ch. 76-260 1976 Fla. Laws (Preamble); French, supra note 2, at 424-25.
16. Note, supra note 2, at 93-95.
17. Ch. 75-9, § 14 1975 Fla. Laws 24 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 627.351(7) (1981)).
As originally enacted, the JUA was to remain in operation for a period of only 3 years.
However, the legislature voted in 1978 to extend the life of the JUA for another 3 years and
in 1981 the JUA's temporary status was removed completely. FLA. STAT. § 627.351(7)(d)
(1981).
18. French, supra note 2, at 425.
19. FLA. STAT. § 627.351(7)(b) (1981).
20. Id.
21. Note, supra note 2, at 94.
22. Id., at 95. See also supra note 4.
23. Note, supra note 2, at 95.
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under recent attack by commentators who allege exorbitant profits
and collusive attempts to suppress competition.24 The JUA pres-
ently offers coverage to Florida health care providers and health
care facilities in amounts of $250,000 per claim or $750,000 per oc-
currence. 25 Current annual premiums range from a high of $38,990
to a low of $2,570.26
As a further method of making professional liability insurance
more accessible to Florida physicians, the legislature adopted a
provision authorizing any "group or association of physicians or
health care facilities composed of any number of members 27 to
self-insure against medical malpractice claims upon receiving ap-
proval from the Department of Insurance.2
Of the numerous self-insurance programs which were spawned as
a result of this legislation, the most successful has been the Florida
Physician's Insurance Reciprocal (Reciprocal).2 9 The Reciprocal
currently insures a significant number of physicians statewide and
has been experiencing recent growth. Between December 1, 1975
and December 1, 1978, the Reciprocal collected over $51 million in
24. Cunningham & Lane, supra note 6, at 118:
The JUA was to be a temporary measure to create an insurance market until the
crisis which was reflected in unstable premium levels no longer existed .... It is
ironic that the desired result of these prqvisions of the Act were to establish an
adequate insurance market at reasonable prices, yet the effect so far has been to
impede competition by the extension of the JUA and to increase the price of
available coverage.
The authors also point out "that between 1975 and the end of 1978, the JUA
had earned premiums of $36,612,367. The JUA paid claims totaling $2,126,872
during the same period of time, had loss expenses in the amount of $385,805, and
had reserved $4,034,324 for known incurred reserved claims." Id.
25. Report, supra note 4, at 7.
26. Id.
27. Ch. 75-9, § 4 1975 Fla. Laws 16 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 627.357 (1981)).
28. Id. In addition to obtaining approval from the Department of Insurance, health care
providers wishing to self-insure must comply with the following conditions:
(a) Establishment of a medical malpractice risk management trust fund to
provide coverage against professional medical malpractice liability.
(b) Employment of professional consultants for loss prevention and claims
management coordination under a risk management program.
Id. at 17.
29. The FMA initially formed the Professional Liability Insurance Trust due to an in-
ability to capitalize an insurance company. This trust was later dissolved and the Reciprocal
was capitalized, assuming all assets and liabilities of the Trust. The Reciprocal enjoyed im-
mediate support due to rates which were almost $20,000 less for high risk specialities at the
time of its inception than those offered by the JUA. See Report of the FMA Committee on
Professional Liability, J. FLA. M.A. (Nov. 1981) (adopted by the FMA Board of Governors,
October 8, 1981).
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
premiums while paying out less than $3.7 million in claims." This
profit margin reflects an overwhelming underwriting gain and dem-
onstrates the actuarial soundness of the Reciprocal. The Recipro-
cal presently offers coverage of up to $500,000 on a claims made
basis. 1 Current premium rates range from a high of $18,996 to a
low of $964.32
The most significant action taken by the legislature in the area
of insurance reform was the establishment of the Florida Patient's
Compensation Fund (PCF).33 The PCF presently provides unlim-
ited liability coverage to qualified members who have paid the re-
quired annual premium and have demonstrated financial responsi-
bility in the primary amount of $100,000."4 Thus, a health care
provider could purchase primary coverage in the amount of
$100,000 through the JUA or a self-insurance plan and then
purchase unlimited liability coverage for claims in excess of
$100,000 through the PCF, assuming affordable premiums.
Remarkably enough, the cost to an individual doctor in becom-
ing a member of the PCF for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1975
was a mere $1,000 for the first year of operation and $500 for each
year thereafter. 5 The cost to hospitals was $300 per bed in the
first year of operation and $300 per bed for each year thereafter."
Florida's health care providers were well pleased with this plan.
30. Cunningham & Lane, supra note 6, at 118.
31. Report, supra note 4, at 7. Insurance policies offered on a "claims-made" basis are
superior to policies written on an "occurrence" basis for several reasons. "Claims-made"
policies cover only those claims made during the policy year regardless of when the injury
actually occurred. "Occurrence" basis policies, on the other hand, provide coverage for al-
leged acts of malpractice which occur during the policy period regardless of when the claim
is made or the suit is filed. This latter type of policy gives rise to a problem referred to as
the "long-tail" in insurance circles. Assume that Company A sold Dr. M an "occurrence"
basis policy in 1980. If Dr. M is sued in 1988 by a patient who suffered an injury in 1980,
then Company A will be responsible for compensating this injury even though it wasn't
claimed until 1988. (Statute of limitation restrictions have been ignored for the sake of sim-
plicity.) Clearly, Company A will have much difficulty in predicting this type of injury.
"Claims-made" policies eliminate the "long-tail" problem.by providing coverage only for
those injuries claimed during the particular year when the policy is in effect.
32. Id. These figures include a surplus contribution of 12.5 percent in 1982.
33. Ch. 75-9, § 15, 1975 Fla. Laws 26 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.54 (1981)).
Membership in the Fund is mandatory for all hospitals unless exempted under paragraphs
(a) or (c) of § 768.54(2). Participation by individual health care providers is voluntary.
34. A health care provider or a hospital may demonstrate financial responsibility either
by posting bond in the amount of $100,000, establishing an approved escrow account in the
amount of $100,000, or obtaining self-insurance through a private insurer, the JUA, or a
self-insurance program.
35. FLA. STAT. § 768.54(3)(c) (1981).
36. Id.
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The ability to buy unlimited liability coverage for such nominal
rates represented "the biggest bargain in the insurance industry,
bar none. 37
The euphoria over this apparent cheap solution was short-lived.
It soon became painfully apparent that the fee rates being charged
were not sufficient to pay out awards and maintain the solvency of
the PCF.35 The PCF went from a net worth of $12,477 in 1976 to a
net loss of $8,264,028 in 1981.3' Estimates for the current year
place the fund $38 million in the red.40 To rectify this shortfall, the
state's physicians were assessed $17 million in January and Febru-
ary of 1982 and face a possible further assessment of nearly $38
million.41 These assessments could have been avoided had doctors
been paying actuarially sound fees, which could have been raised
in yearly increments, if required, rather than artificially freezing
fee rates and necessitating an enormous assessment.42
The Florida Legislature attempted to deal with the PCF's
financial woes in its 1982 special session by once again enacting
stop-gap43 legislation." The new law significantly alters the rate
structure and potential liability of the PCF. Fees for individual
doctors will be scaled up from a previous 1981-82 high of $4,323 to
a 1982-83 high of $19,816, a 358 percent increase.45 Hospitals will
go from a high of $360 per bed in 1981-82 to a high of $701 per bed
in 1982-83, a 94 percent increase.46 In addition, the new law allows
physicians to be assessed up to 200 percent of their annual fee in
the event of a shortfall.47 Further, primary coverage limits will be
37. Miami Herald, June 15, 1982, § A, at 12, col. 3.
38. Memorandum from Linda McMullen, Governor's legislative office, to Dr. Charles
Reed, Deputy Chief of Staff to Governor Bob Graham, May 20, 1982. During the early years
of the Fund, $51,767,952 was paid in awards while only $47,895,736 was collected in premi-
ums. Id.
39. Memorandum from Ray Iannucci, Analyst, Governor's Office of Planning and Budg-
eting, to Bill Kynoch, Policy Coordinator, Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting,
June 8, 1982.
40. Miami Herald, June 15, 1982, § A, at 12, col. 1. Other estimates place the Fund in
the red anywhere from $50 million to $150 million. The Independent Prof., August 1982, at
16, col. 3.
41. Miami Herald, June 15, 1982, § A, at 12, col. 4.
42. Id. at col. 6. As stated by Rep. Tom Gufstafson (D., Fort Lauderdale), Chairman of
the House Insurance Committee in an address to the Broward County Medical Association:
"You weren't paying what you owed five years ago, so you're paying it now." Id.
43. The Independent Prof., July 1982, vol. 2, No. 33, at 4, col. 3.
44. FLA. STAT. § 627.351(4) (1982 Supp.); FLA. STAT. § 768.54 (1982 Supp.).
45. Miami Herald, June 15, 1982, § B, at 1, col. 1.
46. Id.
47. FLA. STAT. § 768.54(3)(c) (1982 Supp.). South Florida physicians vigorously opposed
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increased from $100,000 to $150,000 per claim or $500,000 per oc-
currence as of July 1, 1983, $200,000 per claim or $500,000 per oc-
currence as of July 1, 1986, and $250,000 per claim or $500,000 per
occurrence as of July 1, 1989.48 While these increases will place
added costs on health care providers who must purchase this pri-
mary coverage, these costs could be balanced out by new PCF pro-
visions which would provide premium credits for such excess
coverage.49
More significant than the foregoing changes are the provisions
which remove an outdated cap on PCF resources and place limits
on the fund's liability.5 The PCF had previously been limited to
maintaining no more than $15 million in premiums at any one
time."' The current provision permits the PCF to maintain
whatever amount is necessary to insure acturial soundness.52 An-
other change designed to insure the solvency of the fund is the
provision for limitations on liability.5 3 The new law allows PCF
members to select liability coverage in limits of $1, $2, $3, $5, $8
and $10 million, beyond which physicians would be liable in the
event of an award exceeding the selected limit.5 These reforms,
when coupled with the PCF's new ability to base rates on an indi-
vidual doctor's experience, should aid in driving down fee costs for
some physicians.5 5 Fees are presently based on a three-area geo-
graphical breakdown and five categories of risk classifications."
For example, physicians in Dade and Broward counties currently
pay significantly more in fees than do physicians in the rest of the
state and are expected to continue to do so.5 7
this move, threatening a walkout (which did not materialize) should the legislation be
passed. See Florida Times-Union, June 14, 1982, § B, at 2, col. 1; Miami Herald, June 15,
1982, § A, at 12.
48. FLA. STAT. § 768.54(2)(f) (1982 Supp.).
49. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
50. FLA. STAT. § 768.54(2)(b) (1982 Supp.); FLA. STAT. §768.54(3)(c) (1982 Supp.).
51. FLA. STAT. § 768.54(3)(c) (1982 Supp.).
52. FLA. STAT. § 768.54(2)(b) (1982 Supp.).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. A physician in a low-risk, low-incident category will now be able to avoid paying
premiums for unlimited coverage, which he is unlikely to need, by selecting a $1 or $2 mil-
lion liability limit, thereby effectively covering himself while reducing his premiums. Also,
"good doctors" will be rewarded for favorable claims experience through premium reduc-
tions. This last feature should benefit all physicians who have favorable claims experience
regardless of geographic area or risk category.
56. FLA. STAT. § 768.54(3)(c) (1982 Supp.).
57. Until 1979, all physicians in Florida paid a uniform premium amount to the PCF. In
fiscal year 1979-80, however, doctors in Dade and Broward Counties had their annual premi-
1983]
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B. Internal Reform
In an effort to decrease the incidence of medical malpractice and
the resulting number of claims, the 1975 legislature incorporated
three preventive measures into the Act.58 The first of these mea-
sures requires the establishment of an internal risk management
program by all licensed Florida hospitals.59 While it is the respon-
sibility of the governing board of the health care facility to estab-
lish and maintain its own risk management program, every pro-
gram must include the following components:
(a) The investigation and analysis of the frequency and causes
of general categories and specific types of adverse incidents caus-
ing injury to patients;
(b) The development of appropriate measures to minimize the
risk of injuries and adverse incidents to patients through the co-
operative efforts of all personnel;
(c) The analysis of patient grievances which relate to patient
care and the quality of medical services; and
(d) The development and implementation of an incident re-
porting system based upon the affirmative duty of all health care
providers and all agents and employees of the health care facility
to report injuries and adverse incidents to the hospital risk
manager."
Subsection (d) was added to the original 1975 Act.6 ' To insure
the effectiveness of this new provision, incident reports are consid-
ered to be part of the work papers of the attorney defending the
health care facility and, while subject to discovery, are not admissi-
urns raised from $500 to $1000, while doctors in the rest of the state experienced an in-
creased premium of only $832. These figures increased steadily, with physicians in Dade and
Broward Counties paying consistently more than physicians in the balance of the state. For
1982-83, an obstetrician in Dade and Broward Counties (Area I) will pay $19,816 in mal-
practice premiums, an obstetrician in Palm Beach, Pinellas, Duval, Hillsborough, and Or-
ange Counties (Area II) will pay $11,890, while the remainder of the state's obstetricians
(Area III) will pay only $7,926. Miami Herald, June 15, 1982, 3 § A, at 1.
58. These measures are contained in sections of the Act that are now scattered through-
out various chapters of the 1981 Florida Statutes.
59. Ch. 75-9, § 3, 1975 Fla. Laws 16 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 768.41 (1981)). The
original provision required only those hospitals maintaining more than 300 beds to establish
an internal risk management program. At that time only 20% of the state's 240 licensed
hospitals had over 300 beds. See Note supra note 2. The present statutory language corrects
this weakness and requires all hospitals, health maintenance organizations, other facilities
providing in-house patient care, and similar facilities to participate in the program. FLA.
STAT. § 768.41 (1981).
60. FLA. STAT. § 768.41(1)(a)-(d) (1981).
61. Ch. 76-260, § 2, 1976 Fla. Laws 664.
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ble as evidence in court.6 2 In addition, persons filing an incident
report cannot be subject to civil suit for libel by virtue of such a
report. 3 With the addition of subsection (d), this program pro-
vides health care facilities with a well-structured and effective
method of minimizing future risks through the analysis of past in-
cidents and grievances.
The second preventive measure passed by the legislature vests
the Board of Medical Examiners with the power to discipline er-
rant doctors. 4 Under this provision, physicians may be subject to
sanctions for, among other things:
[bleing unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and
safety to patients by reason of illness or use of alcohol, drugs,
narcotics, chemicals, or any other type of material or as a result of
any mental or physical condition. . .[or for] [g]ross or repeated
malpractice or the failure to practice medicine with that level of
care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably
prudent similar physician as bei'ng acceptable under similar con-
ditions and circumstances.6 "
Disciplinary actions for such violations may include refusal to cer-
tify for licensure, revocation or suspension of a license, restriction
of practice, imposition of a fine, reprimand or placement on proba-
tion.6 This provision presents the Board of Medical Examiners
with an opportunity to confront the problem of medical malprac-
tice at its source - the incompetent or negligent physician. Adher-
ence to a vigorous program calling "sick ' '" 7 or negligent doctors to
task before they are allowed to practice bad medicine on the public
could greatly reduce the incidence of malpractice and rising cost of
malpractice insurance premiums. Recent data, however, suggest
that the board is not taking advantage of this opportunity. For
"the five-year period ending in June 1978, the Florida Board of
Medical Examiners received 1,561 complaints, but revoked only
ten licenses."" If the medical malpractice problem is to be dealt
with effectively, the board will have to exercise its power with
62. FLA. STAT. § 768.41(4) (1981).
63. Id.
64. Ch. 75-9, § 12, 1975 Fla. Laws 22 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 458.331 (1981)).
65. FLA. STAT. § 458.331(s), (t) (1981).
66. Id. at (2) (a)-(f).
67. As used here, the term "sick doctor" refers to those physicians mentioned in Section
458.331(s), Florida Statutes, who, due to alcohol or drug-related problems are incapable of
practicing medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients.
68. Miami Herald, June 13, 1982, § E, col. 3 at 3.
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greater vigor. Perhaps the recent resurgence of malpractice claims,
coupled with enormous jury awards and large premium increases,
will provide the board with the impetus it needs.
The final preventive measure grants hospitals disciplinary pow-
ers similar to those of the Florida Board of Medical Examiners,
outlined above. 9 However, inadequacies which were present in the
1975 version of this provision still persist. Hospitals are merely au-
thorized to take disciplinary action against a physician. As one
commentator noted,70 this legislation would be much more effec-
tive if it required hospitals to carry out an investigation upon
showing of "good cause."
Since hospitals are not required to proceed with disciplinary ac-
tion against a physician charged with malpractice,7 future patients
of such hospitals face the prospect of being treated by a doctor
who may well lack a minimal acceptable level of medical skill and
competence. A solution to this problem would be to require hospi-
tals to investigate any physician charged with medical malpractice
and to proceed with disciplinary action should the situation war-
rant, regardless of the outcome of an independent judicial
proceeding.
C. Tort Reform
1. Medical Liability Mediation Panels.
A significant change brought about by the Act in the area of tort
reform was the establishment of medical malpractice mediation
panels. 2 Before a claim for malpractice could be filed in civil court,
69. Ch. 75-9, § 13, 1975 Fla. Laws 24 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 395.065 (1981)).
Under this provision, hospitals are
authorized to suspend, deny, revoke, or curtail the staff privileges of any staff
member for good cause, which shall include, but not be limited to:
(a) Incompetence.
(b) Negligence.
(c) Being found an habitual user of intoxicants or drugs to the extent that the
physician is deemed dangerous to himself or others.
(d) Being found liable by a court of competent jurisdiction for medical
malpractice.
FLA. STAT. § 395.065 (1981).
70. Note, supra note 2, at 102.
71. FLA. STAT. § 395.065(1)(d) (1981).
72. Ch. 75-9, § 5, 1975 Fla. Laws 17 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 768.44-47 (1981)).
For a comprehensive treatment of the history and procedural mechanisms of these panels,
see Ehrhardt, One Thousand Seven Hundred Days: A History of Medical Malpractice Me-
diation Panels in Florida, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 165 (1980).
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it first had to be submitted to a mediation panel. 7s Although a
claimant was statutorily required to submit to mediation, a defen-
dant had the option of foregoing mediation by not filing an answer
within the required twenty day period .7  However, if the defendant
did file a timely answer, the claim was heard before a mediation
panel composed of a circuit judge acting as a judicial referee, an
attorney and a licensed doctor. 5 Once the claim was before the
panel, the panel had one hundred and twenty days from the date
the claim was filed with the clerk in which to hold a hearing on the
claim. 76 Either party could move for an extension in writing for
good cause shown prior to the expiration of the one hundred and
twenty day period.77 Failure to move for an extension before the
expiration of the one hundred and twenty day period resulted in
dismissal of the claim.78 Once an extension had been granted the
panel had six months from the date the claim was filed within
which to commence a hearing.79 Failure to commence the hearing
within the six month period resulted in dismissal of the claim. 0 If
the hearing was properly commenced within the six month period,
the panel had ten months from the date the claim was filed in
which to conclude the hearing."' Under no circumstances was the
subject matter jurisdiction of the panel to extend beyond ten
months from the filing date of the claim.82 Appeals would not toll
the running of this ten month period. While the panel's finding
as to whether a defendant was actionably negligent was not bind-
ing on either of the parties, it was admissible in a subsequent
trial.8 4
73. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(a) (1981). Some confusion and uncertainty existed as to the
proper procedure to follow in filing and pursuing a mediation claim. In an attempt to clear
up these discrepancies the Florida Supreme Court adopted the Rules of Medicqi Mediation
Procedure which superseded the procedural portions of the Act. In re the Florida Bar, 348
So. 2d 547 (1977).
74. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(1)(c) (1981); Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190(a), 348 So. 2d 547, 550
(1977). For an interesting discussion of the equal protection problems involved here, see
Spence & Stillman, supra note 2, at 1164-69.
75. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2)(g) (1981).
76. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(3) (1981).
77. Id.; Fla. R. Med. P. 20.160(e), 348 So. 2d at 550.
78. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190(b), 348 So. 2d at 550.
79. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.160(e), 348 So. 2d at 550.
80. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190(c), 348 So. 2d at 550.
81. Fla. R. Med. P. 20.190(d), 348 So. 2d at 550.
82. Id.; FLA. STAT. § 768.44(3) (1981).
83. Ehrhardt, supra note 72, at 187.
84. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 805 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041
(1977). Only the panel's finding was admissible at trial. If a claimant chose to offer no evi-
19831
604 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:593
Although the medical mediation panels withstood early constitu-
tional attack,"' the Florida Supreme Court found them to be un-
constitutional in Aldana v. Holub86 as violative of the due process
clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions.8 7 Since
that time a move has been afoot to reenact the mediation panels in
a constitutional manner.88 Such a move, however, is unwarranted
and would only serve the interests of one party - the defendant.
From the claimant's point of view medical mediation panels are
undesirable for several reasons. First, the pre-litigation burden im-
posed upon a claimant is great. He must go to the expense of
presenting his case not once, but twice. The effect of this is not to
weed out frivolous claims which have no merit, but to weed out
small claims which are not worth the added expense of an extra
trial.' Thus, a plaintiff who brings a claim which is not large
enough to meet this threshold is denied access to the courts and a
trial by jury. Secondly, allowing the finding of the mediation panel
to be admitted into evidence at a subsequent trial has a-potentially
prejudicial effect on the losing party in the mediation hearing.90
dence during mediation and thereby received an unfavorable ruling so as to speed up the
process, only the panel's finding of a lack of actionable negligence was admissible at a subse-
quent trial. Thus, a claimant was always put to the expense of fully litigating his claim twice
so as not to be prejudiced at a later trial. Id.
85. Id.
86. 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).
87. Id., at 238. The Court stated that
[tihe medical mediation act is unconstitutional because application of its rigid ju-
risdictional periods has proven arbitrary and capricious in operation, yet the act
cannot be remedied by enlarging the jurisdictional periods or permitting continu-
ances or extensions of time, for to do so would constitute a denial of access to the
courts.
Id. The Court went on to distinquish Sparkman by stating:
[olur rejection of Ms. Sparkman's contention [that the medical mediation act con-
stituted a denial of access to the courts] was based at least in part on the legisla-
ture's finding of 'an imminent danger that a drastic curtailment in the availability
of health care services would occur in this state.'
Id. at 238 n.13. (quoting Sparkman, 335 So. 2d at 805).
88. See, supra note 4 at 14.
89. Some claims as high as $75,000 may be excluded because of the added expense, re-
gardless of the claim's possible merit. Cunningham & Lane, supra note 6, at 120. This con-
clusion also seems to be borne out by data accumulated between July 1, 1975 and June 30,
1978. Of 2,162 civil suits for malpractice which were filed, only 935 proceeded to trial. Of
these 935 cases, 119 were voluntarily dismissed. It does not seem likely that 1,346 frivolous
claims would be filed within a three-year period. Ehrhardt, supra note 72, at 199.
90. Kelley v. Ruben, No. 7B-15303 (Fla. l1th Cir. Ct., Oct. 25, 1979). This injustice was
rarely visited upon the defendant. In 80.6 percent of all mediation hearings held for the
three-year period between July 1, 1975 and June 30, 1978, defendants were not found to be
actionably negligent. It is interesting to note that the physician/panelist found actionable
negligence significantly fewer times than did the other two panelists. Ehrhardt, supra note
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Juries are likely to give great weight to the finding of the media-
tion panel since they believe that the panel is composed of "blue
ribbon" members. However, the jury is not allowed to view tran-
scripts of the proceedings or to examine panel members and are
thereby denied the opportunity to take into consideration any pos-
sible mitigating factors. Consequently, the right to a fair and im-
partial jury trial is severely impaired.
The Aldana court found the time limitations of the medical me-
diation act to be unconstitutional as "arbitrary and capricious in
operation" and thus violative of federal and state due process
clauses. 1 Some doubt exists as to whether any scheme of time lim-
itations could be devised which would be constitutional. Further-
more, the problem of "denial of access to the courts" must also be
considered. In Aldana, the court made it clear that its decision in
Carter v. Sparkman rested largely on the paramount concern of
the continued availability of health care services in Florida.2
While there is a new crisis of sorts, the concern over the continued
unavailability of health care services has not reached the propor-
tions of the 1975 problem. Consequently, the court is not likely to
tolerate today what it would not uphold in 1980 on the basis of
outdated threats and incantations.
2. Statute of Limitations.
One of the gravest injustices wrought by the Act was the modifi-
cation of the medical malpractice statute of limitations. 8 Prior to
the Act, the statute of limitations for medical malpractice was
based on the "discovery rule," which provided that the statute of
limitations ran for two years after the incident was discovered or
should have been discovered through the exercise of due dili-
gence. 4 The new statute of limitations, as contained in the Act,
provides that
[a]n action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within
two years from the time the incident giving rise to the action oc-
curred or within two years from the time the incident is discov-
ered, or should have been discovered with the exercise of due dili-
72, at 205-06.
91. 381 So. 2d at 238. For an informative discussion of the due process problems of the
medical mediation act, see Spence & Stillman, supra note 2, at 1169-82.
92. 381 So. 2d at 238 n.13. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
93. Ch. 75-9, § 7, 1975 Fla. Laws 20 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1981).
94. Ch. 74-382, § 7, 1974 Fla. Laws 1209.
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gence; however, in no event shall the action be commenced later
than four years from the date of the incident or occurrence out of
which the cause of action accrued.95
The sole exception to this four year limitation is for those actions
"in which it can be shown that fraud, concealment, or intentional
misrepresentation of fact prevented the discovery of the injury
within the 4-year period." '96 However, even in these exceptional
cases, the absolute limit of the statute from the date of injury is
seven years.97 Therefore, an incompetent or negligent physician
who injures a patient may knowingly and wilfully conceal his negli-
gence and be immune from liability for malpractice if the victim is
not fortunate enough to have discovered the injury and filed suit
within seven years.98
Insurance carriers, citing "long-tail"99 problems created by the
discovery rule, insisted that a much more restrictive statute of lim-
itations would allow actuaries to make sounder predictions,
thereby reducing insurance premiums and in turn reducing medi-
cal costs. It also was argued that ninety-seven percent of all mal-
practice claims were filed within four years of the date of injury, so
few victims would be done an injustice anyway.100
However, insurance premiums continued to rise and so did medi-
cal costs. The only change brought about by this modification was
that innocent victims of medical malpractice were denied an op-
portunity to seek redress. If, indeed, ninety-seven percent of all
malpractice claims were filed within four years of the date of in-
jury, then no need exists for such an unreasonably short statute of
limitations. The insurers' long-tail problem would only concern
three percent of all malpractice claims filed and would not re-
present the invisible menace insurers would have the legislature
believe it to be.
95. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1981).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. An illustrative case occurred regarding Tampa-based lawyer, Tony Cunningham. It
seems that one of his clients went to a physician for a routine gall bladder removal. How-
ever, the client continued to suffer pain and gastric attacks. After twelve years of other
medical treatment, an observant physician finally checked to see if maybe, after all, she did
have a gall bladder. Indeed, she did since the original physician had never bothered to re-
move it. Cunningham & Lane, supra note 6, at 119.
99. See supra note 31.
100. See generally U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Appendix to Report of
The Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice-Reports, Studies, and Analysis,
DHEW Publication No. (OS) 73-89, at 126 (1973).
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Furthermore, a problem exists regarding Article I, Section 21 of
the Florida Consitution. Section 21 provides that "[t]he courts
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice
shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."' 1 However,
the current medical malpractice statute of limitations operates in
such a manner that it may deny a malpractice victim with a legiti-
mate claim the right to seek compensation for his injury. This con-
tention was advanced by the claimant in Dade County v. Ferro.10 2
The court there, however, neatly side-stepped the issue by holding
that the statute did not apply retroactively.10 3 The demise of Mrs.
Ferro illustrates the problems of the four-year limitation period.
Between December 1970 and May 1971 Mrs. Ferro received radia-
tion therapy treatments. As a result of these treatments she lost
the use of both of her arms. The injury was discovered in Septem-
ber 1975, more than four years after the date of the incident. Had
the current statute of limitations been applied to Mrs. Ferro's
claim, it would have been barred. Perhaps the judiciary's reluc-
tance to apply this statute signals a possibility that this injustice
will be remedied in an appropriate case. If not, then the legislature
should take advantage of the opportunity coming up in its 1983
session to do so itself.
3. Recovery of Cost Law.
One piece of special interest legislation passed in the area of
medical malpractice is the "recovery of cost law."'' 04 This law pro-
vides that the losing party in a medical malpractice action must
pay reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party.10 5 The only
exception is that a party who is insolvent or poverty stricken may
not have fees awarded against him.100 This law was strongly lob-
bied for by the FMA and medical insurance carriers and represents
a clear intent to close the courthouse door to potential medical
malpractice victims. 0 7 Instead of reducing the incidence of mal-
practice and attacking the problem at its root, the recovery of cost
101. Fla. Const., Art. I, § 21 (1981).
102. 384 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 1980).
103. Id. at 1287.
104. FLA. STAT. § 768.56 (1981). For an excellent analysis of the recovery of cost law and
its constitutional implications, see Spence & Roth, Closing the Courthouse Door: Florida's
Spurious Claims Statute, 10 STETSON L. REv. 397 (1981).
105. FLA. STAT. § 768.56 (1981).
106. Id.
107. See Miami Herald, Septmeber 28, 1982, § A, at 11, Col. 5.
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law seeks instead to limit the number of claims filed after the mal-
practice has occurred.
Plaintiffs' attorneys and astute members of the Florida Defense
Lawyers Association opposed this law from its very inception,10 8
but strong support from the FMA and insurance lobbies kept it in
force.110  Recent developments have proven this to be a costly
mistake.
While the recovery of cost law was an attempt to deter injured
Plaintiffs from filing suit, in practical application it has backfired
on its staunchest supporters. In a recent Broward County case, 110
trial judge Robert Andrews awarded $4.4 million in attorney's fees
to the family of a twenty-six year-old girl who was rendered coma-
tose by a physician's negligence. Stunned by the size of this award
and the possible future applications of this statute, the FMA
quickly moved to have it repealed." With all interested parties
lobbying for its removal, perhaps the Florida Legislature will take
action to repeal the recovery of cost law in its 1983 session. Such
action will not leave defendants in a medical malpractice action
wholly without defense from frivolous claims. Florida already has a
statute which allows the court to award attorney's fees to the pre-
vailing party if it appears that the action was brought in "bad
faith." '2 Consequently, a harsher provision such as the recovery of
cost law is both unnecessary and unjustifiable.
4. The Contingent Fee System.
The contingent fee system is one of the most oft-cited culprits
for the emergence of a new medical malpractice crisis.118 Oppo-
nents of the contingent fee system argue that "greedy attorneys,
hungry for fat contingency fees, generate suits that would not oth-
108. Id., at 11.
109. Id., L. Martin Flanagan, former president of the Florida Defense Lawyers Associa-
tion, attempted to have the statute declared unconstitutional when an FMA-insured doctor
he represented was ordered to pay several hundred thousand dollars in legal fees. However,
this action was vetoed by an emphatic FMA refusal to allow him to raise the issue.
110. Von Stetina v. Florida Medical Center, 81-05946 CH (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. Sept.
(1982)).
111. Miami Herald, September 28, 1982, § A, at 1.
112. Fla. Stat. § 57.105 (1981). "The court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee to the
prevailing party in any civil action in which the court finds that there was a complete ab-
sence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party." Id.
113. Report, supra note 4, at 10-11; Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation
- A First Checkup, 50 TuL. L. Rav. 655, 670 (1976). See generally, American Bar Associa-
tion, The Crisis in Medical Professional Negligence: Fact or Fancy, 2 (1977).
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erwise be brought,"" " driving up the cost of insurance premiums
and health care. Proponents, on the other hand, argue that the
contingent fee system is the poor man's key to the courthouse." 5 It
is argued that without such a system persons with meritorious
claims would not be able to bring them due to a lack of funds. In
response to these competing interests a number of states have
opted for a middle-of-the road approach, choosing to limit attor-
ney's fees rather than to abolish them outright." 6 While Florida
has taken no action in this respect, it is time for the legislature to
consider the merits of doing so.
The FMA has suggested that Florida adopt "The New Jersey
Plan," one of the strictest contingency fee limitation schemes in
use by any state. 1 Under this plan, an attorney would be entitled
to 50 percent of the first $1,000 recovered, 40 percent of the next
$2,000 recovered, 33-1/3 percent of the next $47,000 recovered, 20
percent of the next $50,000 recovered and 10 percent of any
amount recovered over $100,000.118 A special arrangement also is
considered where the amount recovered is for the benefit of an in-
fant or incompetent." e Thus, a plaintiff's attorney would be lim-
ited to recovering no more than approximately $38,667 of a
$100,000 claim. Although this system serves its purpose of making
medical malpractice litigation less lucrative to a plaintiff's attor-
ney, its results appear to be extreme.
Pennsylvania's scheme of attorney compensation serves as a
good model of the trade-off between these competing interests. 20
Under this system, an attorney is entitled to 30 percent of the first
$100,000 recovered, 25 percent of the next $100,000 recovered and
20 percent of the balance.' 2' Although the results of this scheme
are similar to that of the New Jersey Plan for awards of $250,000
114. Comment, supra note 111, at 670.
115. The Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers, supra, note 9, at 11.
116. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 1982 Supp.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §
6864 (1980 Supp.); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 671-2 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 39-4213 (1977); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-5.1 (Burns 1982 Supp.); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:8 (1979 Supp.);
N.J Sup. Ct. R. 1:21-7(c) (1972); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.604 (Purdon 1982 Supp.).
117. See, N.J. SuP. CT. R. 1:21-7(c) (1972). This restrictive fee system was affirmed by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in American Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. New Jersey Supreme
Court, 330 A.2d 350 (N.J. 1974).
118. Id. at 351 n.3.
119. Id. The rule provides that "where the amount recovered is for the benefit of an
infant or incompetent and the matter is settled without trial . . .the fee on any amount
recovered up to $50,000 shall not exceed 25%." Id.
120. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.604 (Purdon 1982).
121. Id.
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or less, the difference becomes more visible as the amount recov-
ered exceeds $250,000. For example, assume there is a $1 million
award. Under the New Jersey plan the plaintiff's attorney would
be entitled to $116,967, while under the Pennsylvania scheme he
would be entitled to $215,000. These awards represent 11.7 percent
and 21.5 percent, respectively, of the total recovery. The higher the
award, the closer these figures move toward 10 percent and 20 per-
cent, 2 2 respectively. Consequently, the important figure in setting
limits on contingency fee recoveries is the last, the one indicating
the percent of the balance to be received by the attorney. For this
reason, the Pennsylvania system is preferable. It offers a plaintiff's
attorney reasonable compensation for his time and effort while
preventing exorbitant recoveries.
5. Limitations on Liability and Structured Payment of
Damages
In response to "spectacular" jury awards and rising insurance
costs many states have chosen to place caps on the amount recov-
erable in medical malpractice actions.1 2s These provisions vary
from state to state with some placing limits on the total amount of
general damages recoverable, others placing limits on the amount
recoverable from the PCF or its equivalent and others limiting re-
covery for pain and suffering.124 The FMA, reacting to several large
south Florida jury awards, 2 5 is presently pushing for similar legis-
lation in this state.' 26 The FMA proposal, which is modeled after
the California and Indiana statutes,"27 suggests that an absolute
$250,000 limitation be placed on recovery of damages for pain and
suffering and other non-economic loss.' 2 The reasoning behind
this proposal is that damage awards for pain and suffering, loss of
capacity for enjoyment of life, etc., are so speculative and incapa-
ble of measurement that the jury is given unfettered discretion to
122. For example, with a $10 million award an attorney under the New Jersey scheme
would recover $1,016,967, or 10.2 percent. Under the Pennsylvania system the attorney
would recover $2,015,000, or 20.1 percent.
123. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1982 Supp.); IDAHO CODE § 39-4204 (1977);. IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns 1982 Supp.); NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2825 (1978); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7 (1979 Supp.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-6 (1978); OHno REv. CODE ANN. §
2307.43 (Page 1981).
124. Id.
125. Von Stetina v. Florida Medical Center, supra note 110.
126. Report, supra note 4, at 11-12.
127. See supra note 123.
128. Report, supra note 4, at 7.
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return irrational awards. 1 9 However, refusing to embrace these
claims, a number of state courts have invalidated such statutes on
constitutional grounds. 130 In Carson v. Maurer, New Hampshire
struck down a dollar limitation identical to that proposed by the
FMA."'5 The court determined that the New Hampshire damages
limitation, which was also modeled after the California limitation,
violated the equal protection clause of the New Hampshire Consti-
tution.13 2 Quoting from the North Dakota case of Arneson v. 01-
son,'13 the court stated that:
The limitation of recovery does not provide adequate compensa-
tion to patients with meritorious claims; on the contrary, it does
just the opposite for the most seriously injured claimants. It does
nothing toward the elimination of nonmeritorious claims. Restric-
tions on recovery may encourage physicians to enter into practice
and remain in practice, but do so only at the expense of claimants
with meritorious claims. 34
The court in Carson further stated that, "[i]t is simply unfair
and unreasonable to impose the burden of supporting the medical
care industry solely upon those persons who are most severely in-
jured and therefore most in need of compensation.' ' 3 5 The Carson
court ably recognized that caps on liability do not serve the pur-
pose of eliminating or reducing frivolous claims since recovery for
pain and suffering would not usually exceed $250,000 in these cases
anyway. Rather, it restricts the ability of persons injured in
amounts in excess of $250,000 from seeking full compensation for
129. Id.
130. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (violative of equal protection
under New Hampshire Constitution); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind.
1980) (upheld $500,000 limit against equal protection challenge); Everett v. Goldman, 359
So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978) (upheld absolute $500,000 limit because issue not properly
presented); Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977) (upheld $500,000 limit
against equal protection challenge); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E.2d 903
(Ohio C.P. 1976) (violative of equal protection under Ohio Constitution); Wright v. Central
DuPage Hospital Assoc., 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976) (struck down as violative of equal pro-
tection under Illinois Constitution); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1970) (viola-
tive of equal protection clause of North Dakota Constitution and fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause of the United States Constitution); but see, Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, 175 Cal. Rptr. 177 (3d DCA 1981) (upholding $250,000 limit against equal
protection challenge).
131. 424 A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980).
132. Id. at 838.
133. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1970).
134. 424 A.2d at 837.
135. Id.
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their injuries. Furthermore, the court points out that the spectre of
unreasonably large jury awards is illusory since remittitur is always
available to reduce such verdicts.136 Florida has a similar remittitur
option.1 87 Should the FMA proposal be adopted by the 1983 Flor-
ida Legislature, it is doubtful that it will survive the logic of Car-
son and the hostility of the Florida judiciary to such arbitrary
limitations.
An alternative to limits on liability is available through Florida's
structured payment of damage awards statute. 138 Under this stat-
ute, a defendant, with approval of the court, has a choice of two
options when the damage award exceeds $200,000. He may make a
lump sum payment of all damages assessed, with future economic
losses and expenses reduced to present value,13 9 or he may elect to
pay past and present damages at once and future damages, in
whole or in part, by periodic payments. 40 If the defendant chooses
the second option and the injured claimant dies before all future
payments have been made, the defendant's liability for payments
relating to non-economic losses and future medical care ceases and
the estate may not present a claim. 1" Thus, payments for pain and
suffering and necessary medical expenses continue only so long as
the need for them does. 4" Furthermore, the court is given great
discretion in determining the method, manner and amount of
payment. 143
Therefore, the needs of each claimant may be assessed on an in-
dividual basis and payments may be correspondingly large or
small. This best serves the needs of the claimant while avoiding
136. Id.
137. FLA. STAT. § 768.49 (1981).
138. Id. at § 768.51.
139. Id. at § 768.51(1)(a). Neither the defendant nor the claimant actually have an abso-
lute right to periodic rather than lump-sum payments as the ability to grant such a request
lies within the court's discretion. However, the opportunity and ability to make such a re-
quest is certainly present and no reason appears to exist why, absent a showing of hardship
on the claimant, such a request should be denied.
140. Id. at § 768.51(1)(b).
141. Id. at § 768.51(1)(b)(5). All damages for economic loss are automatically paid into
claimant's estate upon death in one lump sum.
142. Conversely, if the claimant lives past the termination date of the periodic pay-
ments, defendant is required to continue such payments at the regular periodic rate for the
remainder of the claimant's life. Id.
While this may seem harsh at first glance, it is actually merely providing for the jury's
inherent inability to accurately predict the claimant's life expectancy. The purpose of the
jury award is to compensate the victim for his injuries based on his remaining life. Under
this scheme, he receives such compensation.
143. FLA. STAT. § 768.51(1)(b)(1) (1981).
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the rigidity of statutes which have been declared unconstitutional
in other states.144 Such a scheme is certainly preferable to an abso-
lute limitation on the amount of damages which may be awarded.
A structured payment of damage awards system allows a claimant
to be compensated in full while relieving defendants of the burden
of paying out huge lump sums for future non-economic losses.
With this alternative available, no need exists for a restrictive and
unjust limitation on a claimant's potential recovery.
III. A PROPOSAL
Now that the state of the existing law and its problems have
been set out, some possible solutions should be considered.
One of the most troublesome areas is that of insurance reform.
The purpose of the insurance provisions of the 1975 Act was to
make medical malpractice insurance readily available and more af-
fordable. While it has succeeded in increasing the availability of
medical malpractice insurance, it has failed in attempting to make
such insurance more affordable. The blame for this failure, how-
ever, does not rest with the concepts embodied in the Act. Rather
it rests with the mismanagement which followed.
From its very inception, the JUA announced rates which, at the
time, were considered by physicians to be exorbitantly high.145 Yet,
because of these rates the JUA has remained actuarially sound and
has even been experiencing gains.1 46 The PCF, on the other hand,
initially charged rates which were so low that it never had a chance
of achieving actuarial soundness. The PCF's soundness was also
undermined by the artificial resource cap of $15 million which was
placed on it.14 Additionally, the rates being charged were based
upon a two-area geographical breakdown with three risk catego-
ries. ' 48 This fact, coupled with the inability to base a member's
rate on his past track record, kept the higher risk specialists and
repeat offenders from contributing their proportionate share. Con-
versely, this small group of doctors accounted for a large percent-
144. See supra note 130 and cases cited therein. Specific dollar limitations on periodic
payments for all medical malpractice actions, regardless of individual need, seemed to be a
major problem. The Florida statute lacks such a cap. Compare this with the $100,000 annual
cap on PCF payments to injured claimants which was declared unconstitutional by the trial
court in VonStetina v. Florida Medical Center, supra note 110.
145. See supra note 23.
146. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
147. FLA. STAT. § 768.54(3)(c) (1981).
148. FLA. STAT. § 627.351 (1981). Dade and Broward counties constituted one area with
the rest of the state comprising the other.
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age of the malpractice claims filed. 149 With the PCF offering un-
limited coverage, under these circumstances it was only a matter of
time before it became insolvent. If bankruptcy is to be prevented,
drastic action must be taken.
Many of the aforementioned inadequacies were remedied in the
Legislature's 1982 special session. 5 ' However, further action is
necessary. To help reduce the cost of membership fees to the PCF,
credits should be offered for carrying primary insurance in excess
of the minimum amount required. The proposed credits, assuming
the current $100,000 minimum primary coverage, would range
from 22 percent for $200,000 in underlying coverage to 77 percent
for $1 million in underlying coverage.' 5' This could result in a sav-
ings of $5,746 to a Dade or Broward county physician carrying
$250,000 in primary coverage. 152 When added to the doctor's abil-
ity to select liability limits of $1, $2, $3, $5, $8 or $10 million, a
substantial premium savings can be realized.
An area in which immediate action must also be taken is the
PCF's present financial condition. The PCF is currently so far in
the red that no clear estimate of its liability has been revealed. 53
Several proposals have been formulated to rectify this situation.
The most obvious is a fresh assessment against all members of the
PCF based on the new 200 percent contingency assessment fea-
ture. 154 However, this probably would be insufficient to make up
the deficit-not to mention being unappealing to the state's physi-
cians. Among the alternatives suggested are a special assessment
on insurance companies, a hospital bed tax and a subsidy from
state general revenue. 5 5 In the long run the only real difference
between these forms of payment is whether they are visible to the
public (payout from general revenue) or hidden (bed tax or assess-
ment on insurance companies) since the ultimate payor will be the
149. Memorandum from Ray lannucci, analyst, Governor's Office of Planning and Budg-
eting, to Bill Kynoch, Policy Coordinator, Governor's Office of Planning and Budgeting,
June 8, 1982, at 5. A 1978 California report suggests that fewer than one percent of the
state's physicians account for almost 30 percent of all malpractice awards. Id.
150. FLA. STAT. § 678.54 (1982 Supp.).
151. Memorandum, supra note 149, at 2.
152. Id.
153. One commentator suggests the PCF is $38 million in the hole, Miami Herald, June
15, 1982, § A, at 12, col. 1; another places the figure between $50 to $150 million in the red,
The Independent Prof., August 1982, at 16; while an inside government source sets it at
$120 million, memorandum from Tom Herndon, Director, Office of Planning and Budgeting,
to Governor Bob Graham, June 8, 1982, at 1.
154. FLA. STAT. § 768.54(3)(c) (1982 Supp.).
155. Memorandum, supra note 149, at 4.
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consumer of medical services. For this reason a subsidy from gen-
eral revenue is preferable to the other two methods of raising
funds. With a bed tax or a special assessment on insurance compa-
nies, the cost will be passed on to the ultimate consumer with little
or no chance of later recovery. However, a whole or partial govern-
ment subsidy, extended on a one-time basis, may be recovered by
providing that a moderate yearly assessment be imposed on PCF
members. This assessment would operate in much the same way as
the proviso that allows the PCF to borrow against successive
years. 15 1 While it is true that this cost also ultimately will be
passed on to the consumer, it will be done in a more gradual man-
ner and will be only temporary in effect, unlike a continuing bed
tax or special assessment.
Another problem of great concern in the area of medical mal-
practice insurance is that of the physician who "goes bare" and
carries no malpractice insurance. Such irresponsibility falls most
heavily on the shoulders of the injured malpractice victim since he
frequently will go without a remedy in this situation. Recovery
may sometimes be had from the hospital at which the physician
practices,1 57 but this is not a dependable alternative. This situation
could be eliminated by requiring that any health care provider who
wishes to practice in Florida demonstrate proof of malpractice lia-
bility coverage prior to licensing. Civil fines and penalties could
also be used as a follow-up to insure that this coverage is not
dropped subsequent to licensing. In this manner the primary goal
of malpractice insurance will be furthered-to compensate victims
of malpractice for their losses.
As regards the JUA and self-insurance plans, very little need be
or should be done. Contrary to the belief of some commentators,5 8
a viable private insurance market still does not exist.15 9 Until one
does exist, there is no alternative but to keep the JUA. To return
156. FLA. STAT. § 768.54(3)(c) (1982 Supp.). Rather than assessing physicians a full $30
to $50 million in one year, this amount could be borrowed from general revenue by the PCF
and then repaid over a 5-10 year period with interest. Such a plan would not be as hard to
swallow as an outright gift since that would be, in essence, indemnifying physicians who
have been determined to be negligent.
157. Webb v. Priest, 413 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1982); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Keiser, 391
So. 2d 706 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980); Garcia v. Tarrio, 380 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980).
158. See Cunningham & Lane, supra note 6.
159. Memorandum, supra note 149, at 3. Mr. Iannucci states that "[tihe only companies
who are writing excess coverage in the State are: St. Paul, Continental in Orlando, JUA with
limit of $2.5 million in coverage, and Multi-Hospital, an off-shore insurance company which
offers only limited coverage." Id.
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to a private market at this time might seem attractive, but it
would probably only be a short while before rates once again
skyrocketed and insurance became unavailable. Hopefully, the self-
insurance alternative and the slow return of private insurers to
Florida will eventually restore enough competition to the market
that rates will start a downward movement. Finally, a legislative
investigation into the financial status of the JUA with an aim to-
ward possible mandatory rate reduction might well be in order.16
While insurance reform is vitally necessary, as is some tort re-
form, neither go to the heart of the malpractice problem, which is
malpractice itself. In the physician's defense, it must be recognized
that not all patient related injuries arise from malpractice. Many
are caused by the high-risk nature of life and death emergency
treatment and others are caused by the inadequacies of the state of
the art, with undesirable side-effects occurring years later.
Although not all of these injuries are caused by the negligent or
incompetent physician, enough are so caused that some effective
disciplinary mechanism must be implemented and enforced.16' As
outlined previously, several effective means of self-policing pro-
grams have been enacted by the legislature. These provisions pro-
vide the medical community with the power it needs to discipline
errant doctors and "sick" or incompetent physicians. One major
improvement would be to require hospitals to investigate any phy-
sician who has been charged with malpractice.6 ' However, these
provisions are not of much value if the medical profession chooses
not to enforce them, as it seems to have done.16 3 A possible solu-
tion to this laxness might be to require that one member of each
risk management board be an official of the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services, who would be given full access to all
records kept in connection with risk management. Physician errors
would then be more readily exposed and disciplinary measures
could be taken. At the very least, it would make it more difficult to
ignore physician error.
Another troublesome area is that of tort reform. The FMA is
pushing for broad tort reforms designed to restructure legal doc-
160. If the JUA has indeed been experiencing the kind of profits that its 1975-1978
financial statement reflects, then a premium refund should be forthcoming since the JUA
was not set-up to produce a profit.
161. Memorandum, supra note 149, at 6.
162. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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trines in the area of medical malpractice.""4 Trial lawyers' associa-
tions, on the other hand, are vigorously opposing anything which
even resembles reform.1" The legislature would be well advised to
proceed with extreme caution in this area. Many past changes have
been improvidently made due to pressure from special interest
groups, and further unnecessary modifications are not advisable. A
balance must be struck between these competing interests which
will best serve the needs of all parties involved, especially the in-
jured patient. For this reason, few if any changes in established
tort law doctrines should be made by the legislature. More empha-
sis should be placed, instead, on correcting past errors.
The current statute of limitations fails to serve any rational pur-
pose in light of statistics regarding the filing of claims and should
be repealed."' Similarly, the recovery of cost law has proven to be
a "pandora's box" for both claimants and defendants, bearing no
rational relationship to the resolution of the malpractice crisis.6 7
As stated previously, any attempt to reinstate medical mediation
panels would be unwise. Further, the constitutionality of such an
attempt would be doubtful.'68 Voluntary arbitration could provide
an effective alternative to these mandatory review panels. Several
states have already adopted this type of plan. 69 Under voluntary
arbitration, a health care provider and his patient may agree in
writing prior to treatment to submit any malpractice claim to
binding arbitration. In the absence of such an agreement, the par-
ties would still be able to reach an agreement at a later date if a
claim were to arise. In addition, a thirty to sixty day period follow-
ing the agreement should be allowed, during which either party
could revoke the agreement. Voluntary arbitration would provide
an inexpensive and reasonable means of handling disputes. Rather
than foreclosing weak or small claims, it would encourage settle-
ment of these claims as well as larger claims. Constitutional entan-
glements would also be avoided as long as procedural safeguards
required by due process and equal protection are followed.17 0 This
would include ensuring that the agreement to arbitrate was not the
164. See report supra note 4.
165. See The Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers, supra note 9.
166. See supra note 100.
167. See supra note 110.
168. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
169. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1295 (West 1982); LA. REv. STAT. § 9:4230-36 (West 1982
Supp.); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 600.5040-65 (1981).
170. Constitutional considerations become a problem when mandatory binding or non-
binding arbitration is concerned. See Comment, supra note 113, at 683.
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product of a contract of adhesion and that the patient's waiver of
his right to jury trial was knowingly and intelligently made.'71
IV. CONCLUSION
Medical malpractice is real. The crisis is real. To attempt to dis-
count it as a product of physician hysteria or insuror collusion is to
take far too simplistic an approach to the problem. The issue can-
not be drawn in terms of doctor versus lawyer or doctor versus pa-
tient. Much of the past medical malpractice legislation, however,
has done just that. It has been drawn, on the whole, to serve the
special interests of the medical community.
In its 1983 regular session, the legislature once again will be
faced with a barrage of special interest proposals from all sides.
The keynote here should be caution. Short-term solutions should
be implemented where feasible, but they must be carefully consid-
ered regarding their possible long-term effects. Much unnecessary
and unjust change has already been made in the search for a
quick-fix. Long-term solutions must be pursued. Their develop-
ment will be arduous and time-consuming, but the problem de-
mands the effort.
Finally, the medical malpractice problem has been a major con-
cern of Florida legislators for only seven years. Serious and search-
ing thought must be given before legal doctrines which have
evolved over generations are modified or abolished in an attempt
to quickly dispose of the problem.
171. Id. at 685.
